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l. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Prior to divorcing, Plaintiff Lynn Urrutia and her now ex-husband, Johnny Urrutia, were 
the sole members of an entity named Sundance Arena, LLC. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 153-54.) The sole 
asset of this LLC was the "arena property" that was the subject of this litigation, located at 3190 
E 3500 N, Twin Falls County, Idaho. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 15-16,25,30-38,57,60,175) As part of 
their divorce settlement, Ms. Urrutia and Johnny distributed the LLC assets: the arena property 
was awarded entirely to Johnny. (R., Vol. 1, p. 25.) The parties also secured payment of 
Johnny's divorce decree monetary obligations with a Deed of Trust to the arena property; signed 
by Johnny (with full power and authority as a member in a member-managed LLC) (R., Vol. 1, 
pp. 153-54) with Ms. Urrutia as the beneficiary, and TitleFact, Inc., as the Trustee. (R.. Vol. 1, 
pp.32-38.) Also included with this Deed of Trust recording was a quitclaim deed of Ms. 
Urrutia's ownership interest in the arena property; though such interest was of course already 
divested by the Decree of Divorce, anyhow. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 32-38.) 
Johnny failed to make payment on his divorce obligations (R., Vol. 1, pp. 79-81), so, 
pursuant to Idaho Code Sec. 45-1503(1), Ms. Urrutia filed an action to foreclose her Deed of 
Trust. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 15-16.) In the interim, Ty Harrison and Robert Schutte had occupied and 
utilized the arena property. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 118-191.) Not 
wishing to lose their rent-free riding arena, Defendants determined to record a mechanics lien, 
forcing themselves to be named as defendants in Ms. Urrutia's foreclosure suit. (See, R., Vol. 1, 
pp. 16,59-61.) 
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After contentious discovery, Ms. Urrutia filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
seeking a determination that the Harrison/Schutte lien was invalid. (Appellant's Proposed 
Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 3-10; Respondent's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 4, pp. 1-115.) This 
motion was granted, by decision on the record, on October 15,2012. (Tr., Vol. Oct. 15,2012, 
Vasquez, pp. 61-66.) The lower Court found, upon the deposition testimonies submitted, that it 
was absolutely clear that only use/maintenance of the arena property occurred in the ninety days 
prior to the mechanics lien being filed; and therefore, no improvements occurred within ninety 
days of filing, and the lien was therefore invalid. (ld; see also. Appellant's Proposed Augmented 
R., Vol. 3, pp. 394-96.) 
To that point, the only mechanics lien at issue in the case was the one recorded December 
1, 2011. No party had ever amended to assert any other lien as any claim or defense. Therefore, 
Ms. Urrutia certainly could not have filed summary judgment, nor could the lower-court h:lve 
considered on summary judgment, any other alleged mechanics liens. 
Only as of October 15,2012 was an amendment allowed to Defendants Harrison and 
Schutte, to amend their Answer and Counterclaim. and assert a mechanics lien, recorded May 16. 
2012. (Tr., Vol. Oct. 15,2012, Vasquez, pp. 68-69.) Defendants argued, and the lower-court 
allowed the amendment, on the basis that it was a wholly separate lien: for work not beginning 
until 2008, being done on a residential dwelling, not a riding arena, and for an amount different 
than the December 1,2011 lien: $220,000.00. (Id.; see also R., Vol. 1, pp. 82-90.) 
Therefore, after prevailing on invalidating the December 1, 2011 mechanics lien, the only 
remaining claims between Ms. Urrutia and Harrison/Schutte were Harrison and Schutte's 
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counterclaims. Ultimately, Ms. Urrutia prevailed on all remaining claims between these parties, 
as they were all dismissed with prejudice. (R., Vol. I, pp. 302-304.) 
Thereafter, Ms. Urrutia requested attorney's fees (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., 
Vol. 3, pp. 658-669), and such fees were granted. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, 
pp.821-846.) Specifically, the lower court granted fees to Ms. Urrutia as the prevailing party on 
claims of a commercial transaction, pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). (Appellant's Proposed 
Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 827-837.) Particularly, the lower court found that Ms. Urrutia was the 
prevailing party on all claims pled between her and Harrison/Schutte; again, Ms. Urrutia 
prevailed on her claim to invalidate the December I, 20 II lien, and she prevailed on all of 
Harrison and Schutte's counterclaims, as all such counterclaims were ultimately dismissed. 
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 827-835.) The lower court further found that 
the gravamen of the claims pled was a commercial transaction, because the counterclaims by 
Harrison/Schutte against Ms. Urrutia was an allegation that she authorized/agreed to pay for 
work on a commercial property. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. at 835-37.) 
Additionally, the lower court alternatively held that fees were also appropriate pursuant 
to I.C. 12-121. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 838-841.) Specifically, the 
court again found that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing party, and further found that Defendants 
"frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation" "brought, pursued or defended" claims. (ld.) 
The Court found that defending Ms. Urrutia's claim for invalidation of the December I, 2011 
mechanics lien was frivolous at least after the depositions of Mr. Harrison and Mr. Schutte, 
because their deposition testimonies plainly stated that in the 90 days just prior to recording, they 
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had merely operated the horse arena, not made any actual improvements to the real property. 
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 839.) Indeed, the Court limited Plaintiff's 
attorney fee claim to much less than the fees claimed for the entire case. (Appellant's Proposed 
Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 658-669, 846.) 
The Court also found that it was frivolous for Harrison and Schutte to defend the amount 
of the lien claim, as more than $100,000 of the claim was, facially, payments on prior loans, 
property taxes, and a payment to a title company; not improvements to real property. 
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 839; R., Vol., 1, pp. 60.) 
The court also found Defendant's prosecution of their counterclaims to be frivolous. 
First, the Court found it frivolous for the Defendants to assert and prosecute their amended 
counterclaim that the lien recorded May 16,2012 had priority over Ms. Urrutia's lien. 
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 840.) The court found such claim was plainly 
frivolous, because Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust was recorded in 2007, and the May 16,2012 
mechanics lien stated on its face that it only covered work commencing in 2008. Jd. 
Additionally, the Court also found that the final counterclaim against Ms. Urrutia, for 
unjust enrichment, was frivolous because it sought reimbursement for the same amounts listed in 
the May 16, 2012 lien, such amounts stated to be incurred in 2008 and later, and the facts clearly 
established that Ms. Urrutia had lost all ownership interest in the arena property in 2007. 
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 840-41.) 
Finally, the Court further found frivolous Harrison and Schutte's position with respect to 
the preliminary injunction. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 841.) Specifically, 
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while asserting that they were entitled to a mechanics lien for making improvements to the 
property, the Defendants also asserted that none of the materials were fixtures, Le., were not 
improvements to the property, and so no preliminary injunction preventing removal of the 
materials was proper. (ld.) The lower court of course concluded that it was frivolous to assert 
such diametrically opposed positions. (/d.) 
The lower court also granted fees pursuant to I.C. 12-123, which allows for fees as a 
sanction for frivolous conduct, even without finding a prevailing party. (Appellant's Proposed 
Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 841-43.) The lower court of coursed relied on its finding of 
frivolousness pursuant to I.e. 12-121, and so, alternatively, also awarded fees pursuant to I.C. 
12-123. (/d.) 
Finally, the lower court also awarded fees pursuant to IRCP 11. (Appellant's Proposed 
Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 843-44.) First, the court recognized that the requirement to only sign 
filings after making "reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing 
law .... " IRCP J J (a)(1), is strikingly similar to the definition of "frivolous" found in I.C. 12-
123: conduct that is not supported in fact or warranted under law. (Appellant's Proposed 
Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 843.) The court then held that it was a violation of Rule 11 for Mr. 
Rockstahl to acknowledge, in his response to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
that over $100,000 of the lien claim was not for improvements to property, and therefore plainly 
improper under the lien statute, and yet continue to defend the claim, rather than withdraw or 
correct the claim/defense. (/d.) The second lien claim didn't even attempt to correct the first, as 
it stated that it was for different work, commencing in 2008, upon a residential property, and still 
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claimed amounts for property taxes and payments to a title company. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 86-90.) 
Again, the Amended Counterclaim also asserted that the second mechanics lien had priority over 
Ms. Urrutia's lien, despite a priority date stated on the face of the second mechanics lien of 2008, 
with Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust being recorded in 2007. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., 
Vol. 3, pp. 840, 844.) The Court also found a violation of Rule 11 by signing the Amended 
Counterclaim, asserting unjust enrichment against Ms. Urrutia, more than five years after Ms. 
Urrutia lost her interests in the property (in 2007). (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, 
p. 844); see le. § 5-217. 
After finding multiple and alternative grounds for awarding fees to Plaintiff, and despite 
Defendants never challenging the amount claimed for fees, the lower-court nonetheless carefully 
considered the factors in IRCP 54(e)(3), and actually reduced the fee award below the amount 
requested by Plaintiff. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 844-46.) Ultimately 
the lower Court awarded $10,000 in attorney's fees to Plaintiff, against Harrison and Schutte, 
pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-120, 12-121, and 12-123, and awarded $2,500 in fees, against their 
attorney Joe Rockstahl, pursuant to I.C. § 12-123 and IRCP 11. (Appellant's Proposed 
Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 846.) These amounts were in addition to attorney's fees previously 
awarded against defendants for discovery abuses, and for a contempt of the court's preliminary 
injunction. (/d.) 
Despite the lower court's extensive and thoughtful consideration of the facts and 
procedure of this case, and the lower court's logical application of fee statutes to those facts, 
utilizing its sound discretion, Defendants now challenge the attorney's fee award. 
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The only appellate issue, in addition to those stated by Appellant, is Respondent's claim 
for attorney's fees on appeal. Ms. Urrutia claims costs and fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rules 40, 41, and 35(b)(5), and pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 54, 
and Idaho Code Sections 12-120(3), 12-121, and 12-123. Additionally, BECO Const. Co .• Inc. v. 
J-U-B Engineers Inc. very plainly states that if a party is entitled to fees upon an action in the 
lower court, then, because an appeal, even just regarding propriety of fees, is simply a 
continuation of that action, attorney's fees on appeal should also be awarded. 149 Idaho 294, 
298 (2010). 
III. ARGUMENT 
A) STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellants correctly state the applicable standards of review. 
B) MS. URRUTIA CLEARLY HAD STANDING TO BRING HER CLAIMS, BECAUSE SHE 
POSSESSES A PERSONAL STAKE IN THIS LITIGATION, AS THE PROMISSEE OFA 
PROMISSORY NOTE AND THE BENEFICIARY OF A DEED OF TRUST, BOTH AT 
THE CENTER OF THIS LlTIGATlON 
Harrison and Schutte are correct that "standing ... may be raised at any time," even if 
raised for the first time on appeal. Beach Lateral Water Users Ass 'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 
603 (2006). However, Harrison and Schutte fail to understand that standing to bring a claim, and 
the ultimate resolution of that claim, are two different issues. 
Harrison and Schutte argue that Ms. Urrutia did not have standing to bring her claims, 
because they believe her claim to foreclose should be denied, on the alleged basis that her Deed 
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of Trust was not valid. Standing is not a question of the ultimate validity or success of a claim. 
Indeed, Harrison and Schutte's own Appellant Brief cites case-law confirming this: '''The 
doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not the issues the party wishes to 
have adjudicated.'" Appellant's Brief, p. 5 (quoting Youngv. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 
104 (2001» (emphasis added). Appellant's brief fails to even present any argument "focus[ing] 
on the party": Lynn Urrutia; and instead focus their arguments solely on an "issue the party 
wishe[d] to have adjudicated": the validity of Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust. Properly focusing 
instead on the party, Ms. Urrutia, it is clear that Ms. Urrutia had standing to bring a claim to 
foreclose her Deed of Trust. 
The issue of standing simply asks whether the party has a "personal stake" in the 
outcome of the controversy. Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 375 (1999). Ms. 
Urrutia's claim with respect to Harrison and Schutte was her claim to foreclose her Deed of Trust 
on the arena property. (R., Vol. I, pp. 15-16.) The outcome of every foreclosure controversy is 
a determination of whether the subject lien is valid, and whether grounds exist (such as default) 
to foreclose the lien. See generally, 51 AM. JUR. 2D LIENS § 86. Certainly a party named as a 
beneficiary in a Deed of Trust has a personal stake in determining whether that lien is valid and 
enforceable. See, id. (stating that the lienor is the party who should bring an action for 
foreclosure). Therefore, Ms. Urrutia, as the lienor (beneficiary under a deed of trust) certainly 
has standing to bring her foreclosure action. 
Again, Appellants have not actually argued about Ms. Urrutia's standing, but instead 
attempt to argue the validity of her lien. However, the lower-court determined, on Motion for 
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Partial Summary Judgment, that Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust was valid, that a default had 
occurred, and that Ms. Urrutia was entitled to foreclose; the Court simply delayed allowing a 
foreclosure sale until the full extent of the real property (what materials were fixtures and what 
materials were instead removable personal property) could be determined. (Tr., Vol. Oct. 15, 
2012, Vasquez, pp. 62, 70; Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 394-396.) Harrison 
and Schutte never challenged the validity of Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust during the proceedings 
on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 
107-117; Tr., Vol. Oct. 15,2012, Vasquez, pp. 4-56.) The entirety of the record also shows that 
Harrison and Schutte never requested the lower court to reconsider this determination, and s() 
never raised the issue of validity in the court below. Because the issue of the validity of Ms. 
Urrutia's lien was not properly raised in the court below, it cannot now be considered on appeal. 
See, Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231,236 (201O)(internal 
citations omitted). 
Furthermore, the validity of Ms. Urrutia's lien bears no relevance to Harrison's, 
Schutte's, or Rockstahl's frivolous acts and resultant liability for attorney's fees. The only 
relevance it could possibly have was to Harrison and Schutte's claim for fees against Ms. 
Urrutia, alleging frivolousness by her. However, Harrison and Schutte do not appeal the lower 
court's determination denying them fees against Ms. Urrutia. Therefore, the validity of Ms. 
Urrutia's Deed of Trust is in no way even relevant to the issues presented on this appeal. 
Because the ultimate validity of Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust is irrelevant to Ms. Urrutia's 
standing in this case, has been determined below without Appellants ever contesting the issue, 
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thereby waiving the issue for appeal, and is in no manner relevant to the issues before this 
appellate court; and because Ms. Urrutia certainly has a personal stake in determining the 
validity of her lien, and other liens claimed against the same real property, the lower court 
properly granted attorney's fees to Ms. Urrutia, despite Harrison's and Schutte's arguments 
regarding "standing." 
C) THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED ATTORNEY'S FEES TO MS. URRUTIA 
AS THE PREVAILING PARTY IN A DISPUTE FOR WHICH THE GRAVAMEN OF THE 
ACTIONS INVOLVED ALLEGATIONS OF A COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3), in conjunction with IRCP 54, requires an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees to a party who prevails in an action for recovery in a commercial transaction. 
Appellants challenge both the lower court's determination that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing 
party, and the lower court's determination that the gravamen of the claims between these parties 
was for recovery upon commercial transaction(s). 
1) The Lower Court Properly Exercised its Discretion to Determine that Ms. Urrutia was the 
Prevailing Party 
The determination of the prevailing party in a lawsuit is referred to the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and should not be overturned except upon a finding of abuse of discretion. 
Mihalko v. Shepard, 145 Idaho 547, 549 (2008). An abuse of discretion inquiry asks whether 1) 
the lower court understood the issue as one of discretion; 2) applied correct legal standards to 
guide and set the outer boundaries of its discretion; and 3) made its determination with the proper 
exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Center. Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 
(1991). Appellants apparently do not challenge that the lower court recognized the issue as one 
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of discretion, nor do they appear to challenge the legal standards enunciated by the lower court 
and applied to help guide its discretion. Rather, the Appellants only challenge the lower court's 
application of correct legal standards to the facts; i.e., whether the lower court reached its 
decision with proper reasoning. 
In arguing that the lower court did not exercise reason, Harrison and Schutte contend that 
Ms. Urrutia could not have prevailed, because "Ms. Urrutia obtained no relief and the entire suit 
was ultimately dismissed." Appellant's Brief, p. 9. However, this assertion is simply not true. 
The only claims at issue between these parties were 1) Ms. Urrutia's claim, as part of her 
foreclosure claim, to have the December 1,2011 mechanics lien invalidated; 2) Harrison and 
Schutte's amended counterclaim asserting that their May 16,2012 mechanics lien, with a stated 
priority date of2008, was higher in priority than Ms. Urrutia's 2007 recorded Deed of Trust; and 
3) Harrison and Schutte's amended counterclaim for unjust enrichment by way of Ms. Urrutia 
gaining the benefit of Harrison and Schutte's alleged 2008 and post-2008 work upon property for 
which Ms. Urrutia had lost all ownership interest in 2007. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 15-16,82-90.) 
Ms. Urrutia clearly prevailed on her claim, to invalidate the December 1, 2011 mechanics 
lien, as she obtained partial summary judgment of the same. (Tr., Vol. Oct. 15,2012, Vasquez, 
pp. 61-66; Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 394-396.) Ms. Urrutia also clearly 
prevailed on Harrison and Schutte's counterclaims against her, as all were dismissed, with 
prejudice. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 846; R., Vol. 1, pp. 302-304.) 
Therefore, the record plainly discloses that Ms. Urrutia prevailed on each and every claim ever 
pled between these parties, and Harrison and Schutte did not prevail on any claims pled. The 
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lower court plainly recognized this fact, and then properly concluded that Ms. Urrutia was the 
prevailing party. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 827-35); Daisy 
Manufacturing Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 262 (Ct. App. 2000) (abrogated on 
other grounds by BECO Construction Co. v. J-U-B Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294 (2010) 
(holding that obtaining prejudicial dismissal of a claim does constitute prevailing on a claim; 
recognized holding in Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 692 (Ct. App. 1984) to not be 
inconsistent, because Chenery only held dismissal did not make a prevailing party when there 
were multiple claims and counterclaims, and only one claim was dismissed); Sanders v. 
Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 326 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that prevailing on a single claim, in a 
single claim case, does constitute a prevailing party; and holding that gaining a dismissal of a 
claim against you, even without trial or otherwise passing on the merits, also constitutes a 
prevailing party). 
The lower court did mention, in dicta, some context, such as the fact that Ms. Urrutia 
would have ultimately conducted the foreclosure sale she was entitled to, if a senior lien-holder 
had not done so first. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 835.) However, such 
contextual musings clearly were not the basis of the lower court's decision; the fact that Ms. 
Urrutia prevailed on all claims pled between the parties was the basis of the lower-court's 
determination that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing party. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., 
Vol. 3, pp. 827-35.) 
Furthermore, even if a lower court cites an improper basis for its decision, the decision 
should still be upheld if some proper grounds exists. Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling and 
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Pump Co. Inc., 153 Idaho 735, 740 (2012). Although questions arise when a party prevails on 
some claims pled but does not prevail on others, the law in Idaho is clear, that a party who 
actually gains a favorable judgment on all claims pled between parties is certainly the prevailing 
party. Daisy Manufacturing Co., supra; Sanders, supra; Chenery, supra. The record is clear 
that Ms. Urrutia obtained judgment in her favor on all claims pled between the parties, and 
therefore, Idaho law dictates that she is the prevailing party, and the determination of the lower 
court should not be overturned. 
Appellants argue that they at least partially prevailed on the basis that they obtained 
possession of various items of personal property that were, at one time, located upon the subject 
arena property. However, even after being granted leave to amend, Harrison and Schutte never 
made any claim for possession of personalty. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 82-90.) Instead, and despite 
arguing regarding a preliminary injunction that all materials on the property were not 
incorporated into the real property, Harrison and Schutte's claims and defenses, actually pled, 
asserted that they had incorporated all of those materials into the real property, improving the 
real property, and entitling them to a mechanics lien. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 
3, pp. 28-106, 583-599; R., Vol. 1, pp. 82-90.) To then hold that Harrison and Schutte 
nonetheless partially prevailed would be to sanction the tort of "abuse of process." 
The tort of"abuse of process" is committed when a person utilizes the legal process to 
obtain a result outside the scope of the process itself. 1 AM. JUR. 20 ABUSE OF PROCESS § 1. The 
purpose of the mechanics lien process is to provide a means to mechanics and materialmen to 
recover payment for their goods and services, which have been lost to incorporation into real 
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property, out ofthe real property itself. 1 e. § 45-501, et seq. If the goods are still personal 
property, i.e., not incorporated into the real property, one clearly cannot obtain a lien for the 
value of such goods. Id. Instead, the provider of goods must simply bring an action for 
possession of the personalty. Therefore, to attempt to obtain possession of personal property by 
means of a claim to foreclose a mechanics lien is an attempt to obtain a result outside the scope 
of the mechanics lien process; i.e., is a commission of the tort "abuse of process." Certainly one 
cannot conclude that Harrison and Schutte were prevailing parties, even in part, by committing 
the tort of abusing the civil court process. 
Therefore, the record is clear that Ms. Urrutia obtained favorable judgment on each and 
every claim actually pled between the parties, and it was therefore wholly proper, and certainly 
not an abuse of the lower-court's discretion, to conclude that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing 
party for purposes of an attorney's fee award. 
2) The Lower Court Properly Concluded that the Gravamen of the Claims between the 
Parties Alleged a Commercial Transaction, Entitling Ms. Urrutia to an Award of her Reasonable 
Attorney's Fees 
Attorney's fees should be awarded, pursuant to Idaho Code Sec. 12-120(3), when a 
commercial transaction is the "gravamen" of the causes of action. I.e. § 12-120(3); Garner v. 
Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 469 (2011). A commercial transaction is the gravamen of claims when 
the opposing party alleges a commercial transaction as the basis of his claim/defense. Id. (citing 
Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 73 (1994)). In other words, a party cannot avoid a 
fee award pursuant to 12-120(3) when the party itself asserts in its pleadings (likely in hopes of 
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obtaining attorney's fees if he had prevailed) that a commercial transaction is the basis of the 
claims. /d 
Importantly, it matters not whether a commercial transaction is actually proved. /d 
Indeed, if such were required, then only the claimant would ever be entitled to fees under 12-
120(3). Obviously if the defending party prevails, it has proved that in fact no commercial 
transaction did exist to entitle the claimant to relief. Therefore, if actual proof of a commercial 
transaction were necessary, a defendant would never be able to obtain fees. /d. This is clearly 
not the intent of the fees statute. Rather, either prevailing party, whether it is the claimant or 
defendant, is entitled to fees if the claims allege an underlying commercial transaction. Id 
Appellant's only argument against an award of fees pursuant to 12-120(3) is that in/act there 
was no contract between them and Ms. Urrutia. As such is plainly held to be immaterial (the 
basis of the claims alleged are what matters) Harrison and Schutte's appeal of 12-120(3) fees 
must fail. 
In this case, as recognized by the lower court, the basis of the claims pled is clearly an 
allegation of a commercial transaction. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 837.) 
"Here, the counterclaim alleges a contract between the parties. The mechanics lien incorporated 
into the counterclaim alleges a contract. . .. There is no dispute, and the Court finds, that the 
Sundance Arena is a commercial property dedicated to horse related events and that the claim 
that Ms. Urrutia and Johnny authorized work on the arena and that Ms. Urrutia was unjustly 
enriched by the improvements defendants made is a commercial transaction." (/d; see also, R., 
Vol. 1, pp. 1-19; 50-61, 82-90.) 
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Harrison and Schutte plainly alleged a commercial transaction underlying a mechanics 
lien, in order to defend Ms. Urrutia's claim to invalidate their mechanics lien; they plainly 
alleged a commercial transaction with Ms. Urrutia, benefiting Ms. Urrutia, as the basis of their 
counterclaim for unjust enrichment; and the same commercial transaction was alleged as the 
basis of the second mechanics lien, asserted in the counterclaim. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 1-19; 50-61, 
82-90.) Therefore the basis of the claims and defenses between the parties was an alleged 
commercial transaction, and therefore, attorney's fees pursuant to I.e. 12-120(3) were properly 
granted. 
D) THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES TO MS. URRUTIA 
UNDER THE ALTERNATIVE BASIS OF A PREVAILING PARTY IN A CASE WHERE 
THE OPPOSING PARTY BROUGHT, PURSUED, OR DEFENDED CLAIMS 
FRIVOLOUSLY 
The lower court also, and alternatively, awarded fees to Ms. Urrutia pursuant to Idaho 
Code Sec. 12-121 and IRCP 54(e)(l). (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 838-
41.) Idaho Code Sec. 12-121, in conjunction with IRCP 54( e)(1) allows an award of fees, to a 
prevailing party, if the Court finds "from the facts presented to it that the case was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." IRCP 54(e)(J). Such a 
determination is submitted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and therefore can only be 
overruled if the appellate court finds the lower court abused this discretion. Thomas v. Madsen, 
142 Idaho 635, 639 (2006). 
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Harrison and Schutte argue that the lower court's alternative award of fees pursuant to 
12-121 and IRCP 54( e)( 1) should be overturned on the alleged basis that perhaps some, but not 
all of their defenses and claims were frivolous. 
Again, the claims between these parties are the portion of Ms. Urrutia's foreclosure 
claim, seeking to invalidate the December 1,2011 mechanics lien, and Harrison and Schutte's 
counterclaims for priority of the May 16, 2012 lien, and for unjust enrichment. The lower court 
properly considered Harrison and Schutte's defense to Ms. Urrutia's claim, and Harrison and 
Schutte's counterclaims, and in fact found that the defense, and both of the counterclaims were 
all pursued frivolously. 
First, the lower Court determined that it was frivolous to defend Ms. Urrutia's claim to 
invalidate the December 1, 2011 lien after Harrison and Schutte plainly admitted in their 
depositions that they had not made any improvements to, but merely operated, the real property, 
within the ninety days just prior to recording the lien, in violation of the lien timing statute. 
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 839); see, I.C § 45-507; see, Mitchell v. 
Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 231 (1997) (holding that the labor is completed, to begin the running of 
the ninety days, when the last major project is completed; and the time to file is not extended by 
doing minor repairs, maintenance, or cleanup). The record indisputably required this conclusion. 
(Appellant'S Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 46-47, 56-58, 84, 91-92.) Most obviously, Mr. 
Harrison testified that all that was done in September, October, and November of2011 (slightly 
more than the ninety days just prior to the December 1 recording date) was "hauling manure and 
hauling hay and breaking ice and cleaning water buckets." (Appellant's Proposed Augmented 
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R., Vol. 3, pp. 91-92.) Therefore, it was indeed absolutely clear, after the deposition of Mr. 
Harrison, that continuing to pursue defense of Ms. Urrutia's claim to invalidate the December 1, 
2011 mechanic's lien was not supported by facts or warranted by law. 
Furthermore, the lower court acknowledged that it could therefore only award fees 
incurred after the date of the deposition. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 839.) 
And indeed, the Court limited Plaintiffs attorney fee claim to significantly less than the fees 
claimed for the entire case; only granting $10,000 against Harrison and Schutte, of the more than 
$20,000.00 claimed. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 658-69, 846.) Therefore, 
there was no abuse of discretion in the lower court's determination of frivolousness of Harrison's 
and Schutte's defense after the date of the deposition. 
Furthermore, though unnecessarily, the lower court also determined that defense of Ms. 
Urrutia's invalidation claim was also frivolous, from the very begirming, to the extent the 
defense asserted all elements of the December 1, 2011 lien. Just as they argued in the court 
below, Harrison and Schutte argue on appeal that defending the amount of the lien was not 
frivolous, simply because the proper amount would eventually be determined upon trial. 
However, under such logic, no claim or defense could ever be brought or pursued frivolously, 
simply because the claim or defense would eventually be defeated at trial. Obviously I.e. § 12-
121 and IRCP 54 cannot be interpreted to be self-defeating. 
Therefore, the lower court properly rejected Appellant's argument below, and the same 
argument should be rejected now. Rather, the lower court properly found that the statute is 
absolutely clear that a mechanics lien can only cover labor done, and materials provided, to the 
Respondent's Brief -23-
improvement of real property. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 839); IC § 45-
501. The December 1, 2011 lien patently claimed amounts for payments to a title company, 
payments for property taxes, and other non-descript payments. (R., Vol., 1, pp. 60.) The 
problem was not simply a miscalculation of the dollar amount of valid elements of labor or 
materials. Rather, the elements themselves were obviously outside the scope of the mechanics 
lien statute, even upon a cursory statutory review. Therefore, defending these elements of the 
lien, even from the very beginning, was very clearly not warranted by law, and the lower court 
did not abuse its discretion in noting this frivolousness as an additional basis for an award of fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code Sec. 12-121 and IRCP 54(e)(1). 
Additionally, the lower court also properly concluded that pursuing both of Harrison's 
and Schutte's counterclaims was frivolous. 
The court concluded it was frivolous for Defendants to assert a counterclaim for priority 
of the May 16, 2012 lien, above Ms. Urrutia's lien, because the May 16, 2012 lien plainly stated 
that the work began in 2008, and Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust was plainly recorded in 2007. 
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 840; R., Vol. 1, pp. 32-38, 86-90.) On appeal, 
Harrison and Schutte attempt to argue that the priority date of the May 16, 2012 lien could have 
been 2006, despite the fact that it stated on its face that work began in March, 2008. Appellants 
cite to Mr. Urrutia's deposition testimony. However, such deposition only concerned the only 
lien being defended or otherwise at issue in the litigation at the time of the deposition: the 
December 1,2011 mechanics lien. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 332-365) 
(clearly showing that Johnny Urrutia's deposition was taken on April 17, 2012, at p. 365). 
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Therefore, the only evidence of record regarding the dates of work subject of the May 16,2012 
lien is what is claimed on the face of the lien itself. 
Additionally, there is no evidence of record that the May 16, 2012 lien is for the same 
work as the December 1, 2011 lien. The liens claim different start dates, the May 16, 2012 lien 
claims it is for work on a residential property, and the table attached to the May 16,2012 lien 
asserts different categories/elements of the lien, and different dollar amounts. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 59-
61,86-90.) Therefore, the face of the May 16, 2012 lien, the only "evidence" of record 
regarding the May 16, 2012 lien, clearly concerns work distinct from the December 1, 2011 lien, 
and only makes claim for work conducted since 2008. Id Such being the case, it was absolutely 
clear from the time the counterclaim was made that in fact it was lower in priority than M~. 
Urrutia's lien, plainly recorded in 2007. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 32-38.) Asserting such counterclaim 
was therefore not in any manner warranted by law, and the lower court's determination that the 
counterclaim was frivolous was not an abuse of discretion. 
Additionally, the lower court also determined that the final claim between the parties, 
Harrison and Schutte's counterclaim for unjust enrichment, was also brought and pursued 
frivolously. The lower court concluded that there was clearly no benefit conferred upon Ms. 
Urrutia, because the alleged benefit was the same work claimed in the May 16, 2012 lien, begun 
in 2008, and Ms. Urrutia lost her ownership interest in 2007. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented 
R., Vol. 3, pp. 840-41.) If Ms. Urrutia has no ownership interest in the property, improvements 
made plainly cannot confer a benefit upon her. Id 
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Harrison and Schutte agree that the law is absolutely clear that some benefit must have 
been conferred upon Ms. Urrutia, by Harrison and Schutte, in order to support their claim, and 
avoid a frivolousness determination. Harrison and Schutte assert that because they improved the 
property, it is worth more, and Ms. Urrutia would be benefited if she foreclosed. Harrison and 
Schutte's logic is skewed. 
Being a beneficiary to a deed of trust does not provide any ownership interest to Ms. 
Urrutia, nor give her any right to take ownership of the property, even upon default. Even 
obtaining a foreclosure only provides Ms. Urrutia the right to conduct a foreclosure sale, and 
then, only obtain reimbursement up to the amount secured by her Deed of Trust. The amount 
secured, the amount that Ms. Urrutia may obtain upon foreclosure and sale, is not affected by 
any improvements that Harrison and Schutte mayor may not have contributed to the property. 
Because their alleged work can thus in no manner increase the value of Ms. Urrutia's security 
interest (her only interest since 2007), Harrison and Schutte's alleged work on the property can 
in no manner have conferred a benefit upon Ms. Urrutia, as a clear matter oflaw. Their 
counterclaim for unjust enrichment was therefore not supported by facts, nor warranted by any 
existing law, and the lower court's determination cannot be overturned on appeal. 
Finally, although it was not necessary to find frivolousness regarding Harrison and 
Schutte's position regarding the preliminary injunction, as such was not a claim or defense, the 
lower court also found that it was frivolous for Harrison and Schutte to, in one breath, claim that 
they had incorporated significant materials into the real property,justif)1ing a mechanics liel.; and 
yet also claim, in the next breath, that virtually all of the materials were not incorporated, but 
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were simply detached personalty that they should be free to remove. (R., Vol. 3, pp. 28-30, 104-
106; Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 476-77, 583-99, 841.) Obviously, such a 
contradictory position regarding the preliminary injunction makes pursuit of the counterclaims 
all the more frivolous. 
Therefore, the lower court properly found that each and every of Harrison and Schutte's 
defenses and claims was pursued frivolously, and therefore properly awarded attorney's fees, 
alternatively, pursuant to LC. 12-121 and IRCP S4(e)(l). 
E) HAVING PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT ALL OF DEFENDANTS' DEFENSES AND 
CLAIMS WERE BROUGHT AND PURSUED FRIVOLOUSLY, IT WAS OF COURSE 
PROPER FOR THE LOWER COURT TO ALSO, AND ALTERNATIVELY, AWARD 
FEES AS A SANCTION FOR ANY FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT 
Attorney's fees can be awarded as a sanction for any frivolous conduct at any time during 
litigation, irrespective of whether a party prevailed. I.e. § 12-123. Frivolous conduct is defined 
as asserting any claim, defense, position, or otherwise taking any action, respecting the litigation, 
not supported by fact or warranted by law. Id It is important to note that it is not necessary for 
all conduct of Harrison and Schutte to have been frivolous to justify a fee award pursuant to 12-
123. Any incident of frivolous conduct is sufficient to justify a fee award as a sanction. Id 
Therefore, if any of the lower court's conclusions of frivolousness in its analysis under 12-121 
are upheld, then its award of fees pursuant to 12-123 must also be upheld. 
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F) THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS OF FRIVOLOUSNESS PURSUANT TO 12-121 
AND IRCP 54(e)(l) ALSO SUPPORT ITS AWARD OF FEES AGAINST MR. 
ROCKSTAHL AS A RULE 11 SANCTION 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 1 (a)(1) allows court's to award attorney's fees, against 
legal counsel, as a sanction for signing any pleading or other filed document when, after a 
reasonable inquiry, the contents of the document are either not supported by fact, or warranted 
by law. lRCP 11 (a)(I). Because this standard for sanctions mirrors the definition of frivolous 
conduct under 12-121 and Rule 54( e)( 1 ), signing of documents by Mr. Rockstahl, in bringing or 
pursuing Harrison and Schutte's frivolous claims and defenses, is a violation of Rule 11, 
justifying a sanction against Mr. Rockstahl. 
Therefore, it was a proper exercise of the lower court's discretion to award fees, as a 
sanction, against Mr. Rockstahl, for signing the Response to Partial Summary Judgment, and all 
other documents defending the December 1, 2011 lien, without taking any steps to correct or 
withdraw the elements of the lien for "payments" "taxes" and ''titlefact.'' (See, Appellant's 
Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 843-44.) It was also therefore proper to sanction Mr. 
Rockstahl's signature of the counterclaims, as any reasonable inquiry, even just into documents 
attached to Ms. Urrutia's Complaint, would reveal that Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust was recorded 
in 2007, prior to the start date of work stated in the May 16, 2012 lien; and would also reveal that 
Ms. Urrutia lost all ownership interest in the arena property in 2007, prior to the 2008 and later 
work claimed to have unjustly enriched Ms. Urrutia. (See, id) 
Therefore, on essentially the same bases as fees were awardable pursuant to 12-121 and 
Rule 54(e)(I), the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it sanctioned Mr. Rockstahl for 
Respondent's Brief -28-
signing documents in pursuit of defending Ms. Urrutia's invalidation claim, and signing the 
counterclaims. 
G) HARRISON AND SCHUITE ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AITORNEY'S FEES ON 
APPEAL 
Harrison and Schutte assert that they are entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 12-121, only. Fees pursuant to 12-121 can only be awarded ifthe court 
finds that the claim or defense is brought or defended frivolously. IRCP 54(e)(I). The defense 
of this appeal, contained herein, is in no manner frivolous, as it is based on the record, and upon 
existing law. Therefore, even if Harrison and Schutte would prevail on appeal, they are not 
entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. 
IV. RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
If a party is entitled to fees upon an action in the lower court, then, because an appeal, 
even just regarding propriety offees, is simply a continuation of that action, attorney's fees on 
appeal should also be awarded. RECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-R Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294, 
298 (2010). Therefore, if this Court upholds the lower court's award of fees under 12-120(3), 
and/or under 12-1211Rule 54(e)(1), Ms. Urrutia is also entitled to her reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred to defend this appeal. 
Furthermore, the same frivolous conduct committed below also continues in Harrison and 
Schutte's appeal. Harrison and Schutte still assert that they were free to defend, and cause Ms. 
Urrutia to incur expenses addressing, a mechanics lien claim that their counsel admitted included 
elements patently not constituting labor or materials. Harrison and Schutte still assert that they 
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were free to continue to defend a mechanics lien, even after they admitted in their depositions 
that they made no improvements, but merely operated the arena property, within the last ninety 
days prior to recording the lien. Harrison and Schutte still assert that Ms. Urrutia has no valid 
interest in the property, and yet somehow was still benefited, and liable for unjust enrichment, by 
their work on the arena property. And, most egregiously, Harrrison and Schutte claim the 
validity of both mechanics liens, while also arguing that they were free to take all of the 
materials constituting the alleged improvements, off of the property, as detached personal 
property; in other words, arguing that they are justified in committing the tort of abuse of 
process. 
Therefore, the frivolous conduct and signing of frivolous briefs continues on appeal, and 
Ms. Urrutia should therefore also, alternatively, be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal, against 
both Defendants, and their counsel, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-123, and IRCP 11(a)(1). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff prevailed, at summary judgment, on her only claim against Defendants. 
Additionally, all of Defendants counterclaims against Plaintiff were dismissed with prejudice. 
Therefore, Plaintiff is very plainly the prevailing party. As such, Plaintiff was properly awarded 
attorney's fees because the basis of Harrison and Schutte's defense, and the basis of their 
counterclaims, was an allegation of a transaction between themselves and Ms. Urrutia, where 
Ms. Urrutia allegedly contracted with Harrison and Schutte to construct improvements to the 
arena property. 
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Additionally. it was also proper tor the lower court to, alternatively award fees on the 
basis of frivolous claims and defense, because Harrison and Schutte's defense of the first Hen 
\vas fi"ivolous. as it was plainly untimely recorded and included elements not constituting labor 
or materials. Harrison and Schutte's counterclaims were also frivolous, because Ms. Urrutia's 
2007 Deed of Trost is facially prior to Harrison and Schutte's second lien, claiming a work start 
date in 2008: and because the post-2008 alleged improvements to the arena property could not 
possibly have conferred a benefit upon Ms. Urrutia, when she was divested of her ownership 
interest in 2007. 
With all claims and defenses of Harrison and Schutte being frivolous. they certainly 
committed frivolous conduct, and it was therefore also proper tix the lower court to alternatively 
award the attorney's fees as a sanction, pursuant to Idaho Code Section t 2-123. 
Finally, with the defenses and claims being wholly frivolous to bring and pursue. signing 
documents in defense of the first mechanics lien, and signing the counterclaims, was additionally 
a violation of Rule 11, and the award of fees against attorney Joe Rockstahl must also be upheld, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~l~ day of _November-., 2013. 
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Harry DeHaan Law Office 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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Rockstahl Law Office Chtd. 
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